

The Government Response to the Grenfell Inquiry Final Report

What does it mean for Architectural Technology professionals?

On 4 September 2024, the Independent Inquiry into the Grenfell Tower Fire concluded with the publication of its Phase Two Report. The UK Government published its official response (covering actions it will take in England) on 26 February 2025. This report considers the implications of the Government's response for Architectural Technology professionals. It builds on a previous document which considered the Grenfell Inquiry Final Report, which can be found [here](#).

Introduction

1. The Grenfell Tower fire, which took place on the night of 14 June 2017 was a human tragedy, and CIAT extends its deepest sympathies to all the victims, especially the family and friends of the seventy-two people who lost their lives.
2. The Independent Inquiry into the Fire concluded in September 2024, with the publication of its [Final Report](#). The report found failings across the entire building safety ecosystem, including building design and management, emergency response, governance and regulation and made fifty-eight recommendations to address these failings.
3. The [Government response to the Inquiry](#) was published on 26 February 2025. All fifty-eight recommendations have been accepted by the Government or by the relevant authority (either in whole or in part).
4. These recommendations focus on high-level regulatory structures, as well as technical issues such as the regulation of construction products, the definition of higher-risk buildings (HRBs), and approved guidance documents for building regulations. As such, reforms may have implications for specific areas of practice. While full details of many reforms have yet to be developed, it is important that CIAT members understand what further changes are to be expected to England's building safety ecosystem, so that they can continue to practice safely and effectively.
5. Nonetheless, the reforms outlined do not appear likely to significantly disrupt the broad building safety regime as it stands following the passage of the Building Safety Act and reform of Building Regulations; for example, there is no indication that the new gateway approval processes are likely to be substantially overhauled.
6. This briefing will outline the Government's response to each recommendation in turn and will consider the likely impact on professional practice. Some changes had already been put in motion prior to the publication of the full Government response; however, these will be addressed in order through this briefing for ease of review.
7. A large number of recommendations relate to fire and rescue services and emergency response and are not directly relevant to CIAT's membership. These are included in Appendix A for completeness.
8. Recommendations apply to England only. Devolved governments may choose to respond separately, and members should take care to ensure that they comply with the relevant regulations in their jurisdiction(s) of practice.

Recommendations pertaining to building design and construction safety

Recommendation 1: That the government draw together under a single regulator all the functions relating to the construction industry to which we have referred. (113.6)

9. The Government accepts this recommendation in principle, and intends to give the regulator all but two of the recommended functions:
 - Regulation of construction products
 - Development of suitable methods for testing the reaction to fire of construction materials and products
 - Regulation and oversight of building control
 - Licensing of contractors to work on higher-risk buildings
 - Monitoring the operation of the Building Regulations and the statutory guidance and advising the Secretary of State on the need for change
 - Research on matters affecting fire safety in the built environment
 - Collecting information, both in this country and abroad, on matters affecting fire safety
 - Exchanging information with the fire and rescue services on matters affecting fire safety
 - Accrediting fire risk assessors
 - Maintaining a publicly available library of test data and publications
10. Government has taken the view that the regulator should not take responsibility for testing and certification of construction products, or issue certificates of compliance, as this would create a conflict of interest within the regulator. Instead, Government plans to strengthen oversight of Conformity Assessment Bodies through reforms to the construction products regime. Government will also consult on strengthening the regulator to investigate serious building safety incidents.
11. Many of these areas are already regulated. Others, such as licensing of contractors working on higher-risk buildings, will not directly affect Architectural Technology professionals. Nonetheless, members will need to be aware of reforms to regulation and may find other changes, such as the creation of a library of testing data, valuable.
12. The exact design and function of the regulator will be determined through consultation later this year, but CIAT anticipates that it will be created by strengthening the existing Building Safety Regulator (BSR), rather than establishing a new body.
13. CIAT's primary concern with regards to this recommendation is that it substantially increases the responsibility of the regulator. Given that the BSR is already facing challenges in delivering current functions (most notably Gateway approvals), there is scope for this to cause significant further delays and disruption across the sector, for example constraining the fire risk assessor workforce due to delays in accreditation.
14. CIAT will work with other Professional Institutes and industry bodies to advocate for sufficient resourcing of the regulator, so that it can deliver its existing and new functions effectively, without significant disruption to the sector.

Recommendation 2: That the definition of a higher-risk building for the purposes of the Building Safety Act be reviewed urgently. (113.9)

15. The Government accepts this recommendation and will set out plans for an ongoing review to be set out in the Summer.

16. CIAT has called for a more risk-based approach to regulation that takes better account of models of occupation. The Institute will engage with this consultation as it progresses.
17. However, given the significant pressures on the BSR oversight of bodies over eighteen meters in height, any broadening of the definition of higher-risk bodies must be accompanied by proportionate increases in resourcing.

Recommendation 3: That the government bring responsibility for the functions relating to fire safety currently exercised by MHCLG, the Home Office and the Department for Business and Trade into one department under a single Secretary of State. (113.8)

18. The Government accepts this recommendation and has already announced that fire safety related functions will move from the Home Office to MHCLG from 1 April 2025.
19. CIAT does not have a strong view on such “machinery of government” changes and does not anticipate any direct impact on day-to-day practice of building design professionals.

Recommendation 4: That the Secretary of State appoint a Chief Construction Adviser with a sufficient budget and staff to provide advice on all matters affecting the construction industry. (113.9)

20. The Government accepts this recommendation and will appoint a Chief Construction Adviser to advise the Secretary of State, to monitor the department’s work relating to the Building Regulations, statutory guidance and the construction industry more generally, and to bring industry together and hold it to account to help design and deliver the progress we must make together to realise effective reform and culture change. The Chief Construction Adviser will also provide direct input and convene industry engagement into the design and implementation of the single regulator.
21. This role could be a valuable “critical friend” to government, so long as it is not only appropriately resourced, but also afforded operational independence. CIAT will seek to engage with the Chief Construction Adviser when appointed.

Recommendation 5: That the statutory guidance generally, and Approved Document B in particular, be reviewed accordingly and a revised version published as soon as possible. (113.11)

22. The Government accepts this recommendation.
23. A “fundamental review” of the form and functioning of the Approved Documents was announced in late 2024, with a view to ensuring they are clear and user friendly, particularly for SME users. The review is expected to conclude next year.
24. CIAT welcomes this review, and is engaging directly with BSR, which is leading that work.
25. CIAT also regularly engages with consultation on specific updates to Approved Documents, including Approved Document B. Members interested in supporting this work are encouraged to regularly read AT weekly, where opportunities to engage with consultations are listed, or to consult the CIAT website.
26. Members should ensure that they are always working from up-to-date versions of relevant regulations and guidance.

Recommendation 6: That a revised version of the guidance contain a clear warning in each section that the legal requirements are contained in the Building Regulations and that compliance with the guidance will not necessarily result in compliance with them. (113.12)

27. The Government accepts this recommendation, to be addressed through the review of Approved Documents.
28. CIAT's membership is encouraged to take a holistic approach to design and will be aware that Approved Documents cannot cover every possible design situation. If in doubt, professionals should consult relevant regulations.

Recommendation 7: New materials and methods of construction and the practice of overcladding existing buildings make the existence of effective compartmentation a questionable assumption and we recommend that it be reconsidered when Approved Document B is revised. (113.13)

29. The Government accepts this recommendation, to be addressed through the review of Approved Documents.
30. CIAT believes that compartmentation may remain an integral part of fire safety for some buildings, but that it is not necessarily sufficient in itself. Members are reminded members that safe design requires a holistic approach, which takes into account the interaction of building elements as part of a cohesive whole. Principal Designers under the Building Regulations must always assure themselves that the building as designed would comply with all appropriate regulations.

Recommendation 8: Calculating the likely rate of fire spread and the time required for evacuation, including the evacuation of those with physical or mental impairments, are matters for a qualified fire engineer. We ...recommend that the guidance draw attention to the need to make a calculation of that kind. (113.13)

31. The Government accepts this recommendation, which will be implement through the review of Approved Document B.
32. CIAT does not necessarily believe that Approved Document B, which focuses on how to design a building to comply with fire safety regulations, is the best place for a reminder of the need for developing evacuation strategies after occupation, as this reminder may be unlikely to reach intended target audiences. However, this change is unlikely to have a significant impact on building design professionals.

Recommendation 9: That, as far as possible, membership of bodies advising on changes to the statutory guidance should include representatives of the academic community as well as those with practical experience of the industry (including fire engineers) chosen for their experience and skill and should extend beyond those who have served on similar bodies in the past. (113.14)

33. The Government accepts this recommendation.
34. CIAT seeks to engage a broad cross-section of members with both academic and practical experience when responding to consultations on statutory guidance, regulatory or policy change, or in participating in groups which inform government policy.
35. Members with a specific interest in support CIAT in this work are encouraged to contact externalaffairs@ciat.global.

Recommendation 10: That it be made a statutory requirement that a fire safety strategy produced by a registered fire engineer to be submitted with building control applications (at Gateway 2) for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building and for it to be reviewed and re-submitted at the stage of completion (Gateway 3). Such a strategy must take into account the needs of vulnerable people, including the additional time they may require to

leave the building or reach a place of safety within it and any additional facilities necessary to ensure their safety. (113.15)

36. The Government has accepted this recommendation, noting that a fire safety strategy is already required with building control applications for the construction of and significant work to higher-risk buildings. The Building Safety Regulator will consider how to make the current guidance about what is required clearer to applicants.
37. CIAT notes that providing accurate design information at Gateways 2 and 3 is a legal requirement for HRBs and best practice for non-HRBs, which should be routine for Principal Designers. All members and affiliates should be prepared to provide accurate information on their areas of work as and when required. Professionals seeking further guidance on the Gateway processes and the “Golden Thread” of information required for HRBs should consult the Construction Leadership Council’s Delivering the Golden Thread guidance.

Recommendation 11: Assessing performance of external wall systems is a complex, evolving area. We therefore recommend that steps be taken in conjunction with the professional and academic community to develop new test methods that will provide the information needed for such assessments to be carried out reliably. (113.17)

38. The Government accepts this recommendation. The ongoing Approved Document B review will consider any necessary changes to the guidance for external walls.
39. CIAT encourages members to take extra care in the design of external wall systems, particularly while new test methods are in development.

Recommendation 12: BS 9414 should be approached with caution and we recommend that the government make it clear that it should not be used as a substitute for an assessment by a suitably qualified fire engineer. (113.18)

40. The government accepts this recommendation and will address this through the review of Approved Documents.
41. While BS 9414 is likely to be used in conjunction with Approved Document B, CIAT notes that BS 9414 already states it should be used by suitably qualified and experienced professionals.
42. Members and affiliates without appropriate expertise should always seek expert input to assess the suitability of external wall systems, in line with the use of such standards and the CIAT Code of Conduct. As such, the Institute does not believe that this recommendation will have a significant impact on professional practice.
43. CIAT understands that BS 9414 may be revised following any future revisions to BS 8414.

Recommendation 13: That the construction regulator should be responsible for assessing the conformity of construction products with the requirements of legislation, statutory guidance and industry standards and issuing certificates as appropriate. We should expect such certificates to become pre-eminent in the market. (113.22)

44. The government accepts this recommendation in principle.
45. Government has published a Construction Products Green Paper for consultation, with proposals for system-wide reform to the construction products regulatory landscape. This green paper constitutes the Government’s response to the Morrell-Day Independent Review of the Construction Products Testing Regime.

46. CIAT will respond to this consultation in depth and encourages interested members to contact externalaffairs@ciat.global if they wish to support this work. Members may also wish to submit individual responses to the green paper.
47. Regulatory changes would only be implemented following appropriate statutory consultation.

Recommendation 14: Copies of all test results supporting any certificate issued by the construction regulator [should] be included in the certificate; manufacturers [should] be required to provide the construction regulator with the full testing history of the product or material to which the certificate relates and inform the regulator of any material circumstances that may affect its performance, and manufacturers [should] be required by law to provide on request copies of all test results that support claims about fire performance made for their products (113.23)

48. The Government accepts this recommendation in principle, finding that any claims made about a product's performance must be clear, honest, and evidenced, and that test results relied on when placing a product on the market should be accessible and free of charge to those selecting and using the product. It also argues that the national regulator must have powers to mandate disclosure of any information relating to the testing process that it considers necessary to assure itself that a product complies with the law.
49. The details of how this recommendation will be implemented will be addressed through the Construction Products Green Paper, which CIAT will engage with over the coming months.

Recommendation 15: That the profession of fire engineer be recognised and protected by law and that an independent body be established to regulate the profession, define the standards required for membership, maintain a register of members and regulate their conduct. (113.25)

50. The Government accepts this recommendation, though it has not yet specified how this will be regulated.
51. CIAT recognises the need for increased oversight and strengthened competency requirements for fire engineering. However, to ensure that there is not a detrimental impact on the workforce, any regulation must be proportionate and should not exclude other competent professionals. CIAT also notes that the Principal Designer must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the building complies with regulations and meaning they will need to oversee and coordinate the work of regulated fire engineers.
52. CIAT will engage with this process over time.

Recommendation 16: That the government take urgent steps to increase the number of places on high-quality master's level courses in fire engineering accredited by the professional regulator. (113.25)

53. The Government accepts this recommendation and will consider how to increase course provision and take-up most effectively.
54. CIAT supports appropriate education for fire engineers, while noting that this will likely only be one part of what is needed to develop full competence.

Recommendation 17: That the government convene a group of practitioner and academic fire engineers and such other professionals as it thinks fit to produce an authoritative statement of the knowledge and skills to be expected of a competent fire engineer. Such a statement would

also enable others in the construction industry to understand better the nature and importance of a fire engineer's work. (113.27)

55. The Government accepts this recommendation and will convene a panel of academics and industry experts to consider what should be expected of a competent fire engineer. The panel will also support and advise on the implementation of other recommendations in respect of fire engineers.
56. CIAT notes that Principal Designers in particular will need to understand the skills and knowledge of fire engineers and their limits, in order to fulfil their regulatory duties.

Recommendation 18: That the government, working in collaboration with industry and professional bodies, encourage the development of courses in the principles of fire engineering for construction professionals and members of the fire and rescue services as part of their continuing professional development. (113.28)

57. The Government accepts this recommendation and will work with industry and professional bodies to consider how best to encourage the development of courses.
58. Given the importance of fire engineering principles in design, CIAT welcomes the development of additional CPD in this area. The Institute encourages members to consider what additional training might be valuable in strengthening or refreshing their understanding of fire engineering.

Recommendation 19: We recommend that [the Architects Registration Board (ARB) and the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA)] should review the changes already made to ensure they are sufficient in the light of our findings. (113.30)

59. ARB and RIBA have accepted this recommendation, and government has welcomed their action to date.
60. This year, CIAT published a revised Professional Standards Competency Framework, which sets the standards for education, practice and professionalism for Chartered Architectural Technologists. This is informed by the Quality Assurance Agency's Subject Benchmark Statement (SBS), which was updated in 2022 with a greater focus on building safety. CIAT reminds all members and affiliates of their obligations to uphold professional standards, maintain currency of their knowledge, skills and experience (competence), accurately represent the services they offer, and decline to provide services which they knowingly lack appropriate resources to deliver, as detailed within the CIAT Code of Conduct.

Recommendation 20: That it be made a statutory requirement that an application for building control approval in relation to the construction or refurbishment of a higher-risk building (Gateway 2) be supported by a statement from a senior manager of the principal designer under the Building Safety Act 2022 that all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that on completion the building as designed will be as safe as is required by the Building Regulations. (113.31)

61. The Government accepts this recommendation and intends to make the inclusion of such a statement a statutory requirement of building control approval applications. Government will also consider whether this requirement should extend beyond higher-risk buildings.
62. CIAT notes that this recommendation functionally amounts to Principal Designers declaring that they have done what they are legally required to do – in effect, this declaration is already implicit in the act of applying for a building completion certificate.

63. Nonetheless, signing a declaration may prompt a designer to “double check” that they have done what is required. Principal Designers should be prepared for this additional paperwork requirement to come into effect in due course.

Recommendation 21: That a licensing scheme operated by the construction regulator be introduced for principal contractors wishing to undertake the construction or refurbishment of higher-risk buildings and that it be a legal requirement that any application for building control approval for the construction or refurbishment of a higher-risk building (Gateway 2) be supported by a personal undertaking from a director or senior manager of the principal contractor to take all reasonable care to ensure that on completion and handover the building is as safe as is required by the Building Regulations. (113.33)

64. The Government accepts this recommendation and intends to explore how it can be implemented, building on the dutyholder regime.
65. While recognising the importance of ensuring competence of professionals, CIAT is also conscious of the pressures on the construction workforce and would be concerned about the potential negative impacts of a burdensome licensing scheme.
66. It is also unclear how this licensing scheme would interact with initiatives such as the CIOB Principal Contractor Competency Certification Scheme.
67. The new requirement for a written declaration that the Principal Contractor has taken reasonable steps to ensure the building meets regulations has the same pros and cons as the declaration for Principal Designers but is likely to have minimal impact on designers.

Recommendation 22: That the government appoint an independent panel to consider whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process. (113.37)

68. The Government accepts this recommendation. A panel will be established to make recommendations on which bodies carry out building control functions, and whether all building control should be performed by a single national body.
69. CIAT will update members on the activity and recommendations of the independent panel, and its implications for building control as they are developed. For the time being, however, there are no immediate changes to building control as it current operates following the passage of the Building Safety Act.

Recommendation 23: We recommend that the same panel consider whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority. (113.38)

70. The Government accepts this recommendation, as outlined under recommendation twenty-two.

Recommendation 24: We recommend that the construction regulator sponsor the development of a similar library [to the Cladding Materials Library set up by the University of Queensland], perhaps as part of a joint project with the University of Queensland, to provide a continuing resource for designers. (113.39)

71. The Government accepts this recommendation, and will consider how to improve access to information, resources, and test results through a digitally based library, as part of wider construction product reforms.

72. CIAT supports the provision of enhanced information on construction products, and will engage with these reforms, including developing a response to the Construction Products Green Paper in the coming months.

Recommendation 25: That it be made a legal requirement for the government to maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations made by select committees, coroners and public inquiries together with a description of the steps taken in response. If the government decides not to accept a recommendation, it should record its reasons for doing so. Scrutiny of its actions should be a matter for Parliament, to which it should be required to report annually. (113.40)

73. The Government accepts this recommendation in principle. It commits to establish a record on GOV.UK of all recommendations made by public inquiries since 2024 and will consider making this an enduring legal requirement.
74. In the case of the response to these recommendations specifically, Government has committed to quarterly progress reporting and annual updates to parliament.
75. CIAT welcomes these steps, which will help ensure that statutory public Inquiries such as the Grenfell Tower Inquiry drive genuine change, rather than just gathering dust on a shelf.

Recommendation 26: That the government establish a system of mandatory accreditation to certify the competence of fire risk assessors by setting standards for qualification and continuing professional development and such other measures as may be considered necessary or desirable. (133.41)

76. The Government accepts this recommendation and will legislate for fire risk assessors to have competence verified by a UKAS-accredited Certification Body.
77. CIAT again recognises the importance of ensuring that such safety critical roles are underpinned by appropriate professional competencies, though the impact of any new regulatory burdens on the workforce should also be considered and mitigated as far as possible.

Recommendation 27: We are not in a position to determine whether greater standardisation of the fire control switches and keys is required. We therefore recommend that the government seeks urgent advice from the Building Safety Regulator and the National Fire Chiefs Council on the nature and scale of the problem and the appropriate response to it. (113.43)

78. The government accepts this recommendation. The National Fire Chiefs Council are reviewing the guidance for the provision of lift fire control switches with the Building Safety Regulator to support a view on standardisation in buildings. They are also surveying fire and rescue services to establish how lift keys, and the type of key, are distributed to firefighters.
79. Building design professionals who may have reason to design or specify control switches should ensure that follow any regulation or guidance from Government, NFCC or BSR.

Further areas of action

80. In addition to responding to the specific recommendations, the Government wants to “catalyse a shift in safety and quality of our housing for everyone, including the most vulnerable”, laying the foundations for building and fire safety systems “that deliver better outcomes for residents across the country”.

81. The Government wants to ensure that residents are placed at the heart of the building safety system. The response highlights Government action to strengthen renters' rights to decent quality homes, and the Regulator of Social Housing's new Transparency, Influence and Accountability Standard.
82. While building design professionals may have limited direct engagement with residents, CIAT reminds members and affiliates to be mindful of their obligations to current or prospective users of buildings, and to retain a focus on high quality, safe and human-centric design.
83. The Government's response to the Recommendations also includes further detailed commentary on a number of areas addressed in the recommendations, including:
- Reform of construction products regulation. CIAT will respond to the Construction Products Green Paper in due course. Members who wish to support this work are invited to email externalaffairs@ciat.global.
 - The form and scope of Approved Documents in general, and the content of Approved Document B in particular. CIAT is currently supporting BSR in their review of Approved Documents.
 - The definition of high-risk buildings.
 - Standards for social and private rented housing.
 - Stronger definitions of competency in key professions including building control, fire engineering, fire risk assessment and principal contractors.
 - Clearer accountabilities at the highest level, through unified regulation and governance.
84. Finally, alongside their response to the Inquiry, Government announced their intention to launch investigations into seven organisations to determine whether the organisations have engaged in professional misconduct for the purposes of the Procurement Act 2023.
85. The organisations in question are:
- Arconic Architectural Products SAS
 - Saint-Gobain Construction Products UK Limited in relation to the actions of Celotex Limited (which it owned at the relevant time)
 - Exova (UK) Limited
 - Harley Facades Limited
 - Kingspan Insulation Limited
 - Rydon Maintenance Limited
 - Studio E Architects Limited
86. If found to have engaged in professional misconduct, a supplier can be barred from participating in future public procurement processes.

Next steps

87. The Government has laid out their planned next steps in three phases.

Phase 1 (2025 to 2026): delivery of existing reform

88. The first phase will focus on delivering the current programme of regulatory reform and change. This includes strengthening and embedding the Building Safety Act and the Building Safety Regulator, and addressing unsafe cladding through the Remediation Action Plan.
89. Consultation on the Construction Products Green Paper will take place over the next three months. Government will also introduce legislation to implement Awaab's Law (to require landlords to address health hazards such as damp and mould), in the social and private rented sector, legislate for stringent electric safety standards in social housing, set new regulatory standards for the competence and conduct of social housing staff and introduce access to information requirements for private registered providers
90. Over the next year, Government will conclude reviews into the building control regime and the Approved Documents suite of statutory guidance. All proposed changes will be consulted on. The Government will also set out our plans for the ongoing review of the definition of a higher-risk building in summer 2025.

Phase 2 (2026 to 2028): further development and legislation

91. The second phase will focus on having fully developed proposals to deliver recommendations and wider reform. Legislation will be required to deliver reforms to construction products regulation, to establish the single construction regulator and to strengthen competency standards of key fire safety critical professions such as fire engineers, fire risk assessors and principal contractors.
92. Government intends that, during this time, the definition of a higher-risk building and Approved Document B will remain under continuous review, responding to changes in the wider built environment.
93. At the same time, there a significant programme of social and private rented housing reform will be delivered, including new regulatory standards for decency and energy efficiency. Government will also set out further measures to strengthen tenants' voices.

Phase 3 (2028 onwards): implementation

94. With necessary legislation and regulatory powers in place, this will allow the Government to focus on implementing the reforms which will have been introduced over the previous years. This will seek to remove fragmentation from the regulatory system. Government will keep the new system under review to evaluate its effectiveness in delivering a safer built environment.

CIAT, March 2025.

For more information, contact externalaffairs@ciat.global.

Appendix A: Recommendations not directly relevant to building design

1. These recommendations focus on fire and rescue services, and on emergency response. CIAT does not have any comments on these recommendations, but they are included here for completeness.

Recommendation 28: That every gas transporter be required by law to check the accessibility of each such valve on its system at least once every three years and to report the results of that inspection to the Health and Safety Executive as part of its gas safety case review. (113.44)

2. The government accepts this recommendation in principle.

Recommendation 29: That the government establish [an independent College of Fire and Rescue] immediately with sufficient resources to provide the following services nationally: practical training at all levels supplementary to that provided by individual fire and rescue services; education in the form of lectures and seminars on different aspects of the work of the fire and rescue services in order to share experience and promote good practice; research into matters that may affect the work of the fire and rescue services, including major fires; the development of equipment, policies and procedures suitable for ensuring the effectiveness of fire and rescue services nationally and the safety of firefighters and the public; setting and maintaining national standards of managerial competence for senior managers, including control room managers, and providing management training for, and regular assessment of, senior ranks by reference to such standards. (113.51)

3. The government accepts this recommendation in principle, while noting that establishing a college will require primary legislation. It will consult on this from summer 2025.

Recommendation 30: That [the College of Fire and Rescue] should have a permanent staff of sufficient size to manage its operations and develop its functions in response to the demands of fire and rescue services nationally and the requirements of the board. The college will need access to permanent facilities, including facilities for practical training and education. We envisage that much of the training and education will be delivered and led by firefighters of suitable experience drawn as the occasion requires from fire and rescue services around the country. (113.53)

4. The Government accepts this recommendation in principle, in line with recommendation twenty-nine.

Recommendation 31: That His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services ("the Inspectorate") inspect the London Fire Brigade as soon as reasonably possible to assess and report on: the extent to which the control room is now integrated into the organisation; the effectiveness of the arrangements for identifying the training needs of control room staff, delivering effective training and recording its outcomes; the effectiveness of the control room generally; the ability of the control room to handle a large number of concurrent requests for advice and assistance from people directly affected by fires or other emergencies; the quality and effectiveness of the arrangements for communication between the control room and the incident commander. (113.55)

5. His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) accepts this recommendation.
6. HMICFRS most recently inspected London Fire Brigade in February 2024. HMICFRS found that London Fire Brigade had made significant improvements in their performance since their previous inspection in January 2022.

Recommendation 32: That as soon as reasonably possible the Inspectorate inspect the London Fire Brigade to examine and report on the arrangements it has in place for assessing the training of incident commanders at all levels and their continuing competence, whether by a process of revalidation or otherwise. (133.56)

7. His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) accepts this recommendation. See recommendation thirty-one.

Recommendation 33: That as soon as reasonably practicable the Inspectorate inspect the LFB to examine and report on its arrangements for collecting, storing and distributing information in accordance with section 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, and in particular its arrangements for identifying high-risk residential buildings and collecting, storing and distributing information relating to them (113.57)

8. His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) accepts this recommendation. See recommendation thirty-one.

Recommendation 34 That the London Fire Brigade establish effective standing arrangements for collecting, considering and effectively implementing lessons learned from previous incidents, inquests and investigations. Those arrangements should be as simple as possible, flexible and of a kind that will ensure that any appropriate changes in practice or procedure are implemented speedily. (113.58)

9. London Fire Brigade accepts all the recommendations relevant to them, including this one aimed directly at them.

Recommendation 35: That fire and rescue services that continue to use low power intrinsically safe radios as part of breathing apparatus consider reserving them only for situations in which there is a real risk of igniting flammable gases and generally using radios of higher power, particularly in high-rise buildings. (113.59)

10. The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) accepts this recommendation on behalf of all fire and rescue services.

Recommendation 36: That all fire and rescue services give consideration to providing all firefighters with digital radios. (113.60)

11. The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) accepts this recommendation on behalf of all fire and rescue services.

Recommendation 37: Since radio communications are inherently unreliable in certain environments, we recommend that firefighters be trained to respond appropriately to the loss of communications and to understand how to restore them. (113.61)

12. The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) accepts this recommendation on behalf of all fire and rescue services.

Recommendation 38: That basic training on the structure and operation of the water supply system, including the different types of hydrants in use and their functions, be given to all firefighters. Training should also be given on effective measures to increase water flow and pressure when necessary. (113.62)

13. The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) accepts this recommendation on behalf of all fire and rescue services.

Recommendation 39: That all fire and rescue services establish and periodically review an agreed protocol with the statutory water undertakers in their areas to enable effective

communication between them in relation to the supply of water for firefighting purposes. (113.63)

14. The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) accepts this recommendation on behalf of all fire and rescue services.

Recommendation 40: That the British Standards Institution amend BS 750 to include a description of the circumstances under which the flow coefficient to which it refers in paragraph 10.2 is to be measured. (113.64)

15. The British Standards Institution (BSI) accepts this recommendation. It will amend BS 750 accordingly and expect to publish the revised standard, following the usual standards development process and consultation, towards the end of 2025.

Recommendation 41: That National Fire Chiefs Council consider whether, and if so in what circumstances, firefighters should be discouraged from departing from their instructions on their own initiative and provide appropriate training in how to respond to a situation of that kind. (113.65)

16. The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) accepts this recommendation.

Recommendation 42: That the [Civil Contingencies] Act [2004] be reviewed and consideration be given to granting a designated Secretary of State the power to carry out the functions of a Category 1 responder in its place for a limited period of time. (113.67)

17. The Government accepts this recommendation.

Recommendation 43: Regulation 23 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 requires a Category 1 responder to have regard when making its plans to the activities of relevant voluntary organisations. We therefore recommend that the regulation be amended to require Category 1 responders to establish and maintain partnerships with the voluntary, community and faith organisations in the areas in which they are responsible for preparing for and responding to emergencies. (113.68)

18. The Government accepts this recommendation in principle.

Recommendation 44: The current guidance on preparing for emergencies is contained in several documents, all of which are unduly long and in some respects out of date. We recommend that the guidance be revised, reduced in length and consolidated in one document which lays greater emphasis on the need for those leading the response to consider the requirements for recovery, the need to identify vulnerable people, the importance of identifying and ensuring co-operation with voluntary, community and faith groups and is consistent with the Equality Act 2010. (113.69)

19. The Government accepts this recommendation.

Recommendation 45: That regard for humanitarian considerations be expressly recognised by making it the ninth principle of effective response and recovery. (113.69)

20. The government accepts this recommendation.

Recommendation 46: Events demonstrated, however, that there is a need for a clearer understanding of the nature of the London Gold arrangements, in particular in situations in which a single borough is affected. We therefore recommend that the guidance on the operation of those arrangements be revised and that existing and newly appointed chief executives be given regular training to ensure they are familiar with its principles. (113.70)

21. The Government supports this recommendation made towards London local authorities and the London Local Authorities Regional Resilience Board.

Recommendation 47: That local resilience forums adopt national standards to ensure effective training, preparation and planning for emergencies and adopt independent auditing schemes to identify deficiencies and secure compliance. (113.71)

22. The government accepts this recommendation.

Recommendation 48: That a mechanism be introduced for independently verifying the frequency and quality of training provided by local authorities and other Category 1 responders. (113.71)

23. The government accepts this recommendation made towards Category 1 responders in principle.

Recommendation 49: That local authorities train all their employees, including chief executives, to regard resilience as an integral part of their responsibilities.

24. The government supports this recommendation made towards local authorities.

Recommendation 50: Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) had no effective means of collecting and recording information about those who had been displaced from the tower and surrounding buildings, including those who were missing. Compiling reliable information of that kind is difficult and the challenges likely to be faced by local authority Category 1 responders will vary according to the nature of the emergency. We recommend that all local authorities devise methods of obtaining and recording information of that kind, if possible in electronic form, and practise putting them into operation under a variety of different circumstances. (113.74)

25. The government supports this recommendation made towards local authorities.

Recommendation 51: That all local authorities make such arrangements as are reasonably practicable for enabling them to place people in temporary accommodation at short notice and in ways that meet their personal, religious and cultural requirements. Such arrangements should, as far as possible, involve local providers of social housing. (113.75)

26. The government supports this recommendation made towards local authorities.

Recommendation 52: That all local authorities include in their contingency plans arrangements for providing immediate financial assistance to people affected by an emergency. (113.76)

27. The government supports this recommendation made towards local authorities.

Recommendation 53: That as part of their planning for emergencies local authorities give detailed consideration to the availability of key workers and the role they are expected to play so that suitable contingency arrangements can be made to ensure, as far as possible, continuity of support. (113.76)

28. The government supports this recommendation made towards local authorities, noting that this recommendation is made in reference to social workers.

Recommendation 54: That as part of their emergency planning local authorities make effective arrangements for continuing communication with those who need assistance using the most suitable technology and a range of languages appropriate to the area. (113.77)

29. The government supports this recommendation made towards local authorities.

Recommendation 55: That all local authorities include in their plans for responding to emergencies arrangements for providing information to the public by whatever combination of modern methods of communication are likely to be most effective for the areas for which they are responsible. (113.78)

30. The government supports this recommendation made towards local authorities.

Recommendation 56: That what in the past has been called by the police a “casualty bureau” be described in a way that makes it clear that it does not provide information to the public about people affected by the emergency. (113.78)

31. The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) accepts this recommendation.

Recommendation 57: That further consideration be given to the recommendations made in the Phase 1 report in the light of our findings in this report. (113.82)

32. The government accepts this recommendation.

Recommendation 58: That the advice contained in paragraph 79.11 of the LGA Guide be reconsidered. (113.83)

33. The government accepts this recommendation.